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Descartes, corpuscles and reductionism: mechanism 
and systems in Descartes’s physiology
Barnaby R. Hutchins
ABSTRACT: I argue that Descartes explains physiology in terms of whole systems, and not in 
terms of the size, shape and motion of tiny corpuscles (corpuscular mechanics). It is a standard, 
entrenched view that Descartes’s proper means of explanation in the natural world is through 
strict reduction to corpuscular mechanics. This view is bolstered by a handful of corpuscular-
mechanical explanations in Descartes’s physics, which have been taken to be representative of 
his treatment of all natural phenomena. However, Descartes’s explanations of the ‘principal 
parts’ of physiology do not follow the corpuscular–mechanical pattern. Des Chene (2001) has 
identified systems in Descartes’s account of physiology, but takes them ultimately to reduce 
down to the corpuscle level. I argue that they do not. Rather, Descartes maintains entire 
systems, with components selected from multiple levels of organisation, in order to construct 
more complete explanations than corpuscular mechanics alone would allow.
Keywords: Descartes; mechanism; reductionism; systematicity
1. Introduction
This paper is a reconstruction of Descartes’s approach to physiology in which his explanations of 
the principal operations of the body are understood in terms of systems. A systems reading of 
Descartes’s physiology is at odds with the received view on explanation in Descartes’s natural 
philosophy, which takes him to reduce all phenomena in the natural world to ‘the size, shape, and 
motion of the tiny parts that make it up’ (Garber 2001c: 112). A systems explanation cannot be a 
reduction right down to this corpuscular mechanics, because it is the system itself that carries 
the explanatory weight, rather than its lowest-level components.
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Elsewhere in his natural philosophy, Descartes arguably does make use of explanations in terms 
of corpuscular mechanics (but see §3.3 for discussion of whether even his physics is corpuscular-
mechanical). Most notably, the propagation and colour of light are reduced to, respectively, 
tendency to longitudinal motion and rotation of the very smallest pieces of matter. These 
explanations of light have come to be seen as archetypal for Descartes’s treatment of natural 
phenomena.1 Given his commitment to the unity of the sciences, it makes sense to presume that 
Descartes explains all aspects of the natural world, including physiology, in the same way, such 
that what goes for light also goes for the living body.2 Thus, Clarke tells us that ‘Descartes’s whole 
scientific project is one of imaginatively constructing descriptions of the motions of particles 
which might explain natural phenomena’ (1982: 124); in a recent paper, Theurer asserts that 
Descartes’s aim is ‘to explain all of human physiology in terms of the principles of Cartesian 
physics. Ideally, all of this could be explained in terms of the properties of fundamental 
particles’ (2013: 912–3). This position is echoed in both Hatfield 1992 (340) and (in a more 
restricted context) Hatfield 2002 (635), while Fuchs (2001) sees Descartes’s aim in physiology as 
being ‘to explain vegetative-vital processes exclusively in terms of [the] lowest level’ (123), which 
involves reducing the ‘vital heat’ provided by the heart to nothing more than ‘an exothermic 
reaction of particles’ (115). It is symptomatic of this approach that Smith (2006a: 14; 2006b: 88) 
sees Descartes’s inability to account for embryogenesis specifically in terms of corpuscular 
mechanics as a ‘failure’.
By contrast, Des Chene (2001) has convincingly shown that there is more to Descartes’s 
treatment of physiology than corpuscles: there are systems too. Similarly, Brown (2011) has 
argued that Descartes’s account of embryogenesis consists of a ‘whole matrix of interdependent 
1 The propagation of light tends to be the key example in scholarship on Descartes’s use of analogy in natural 
philosophy. See, e.g., Clarke 1982 (122ﬀ.), Galison 1984; Manning 2012. The account of colour is often used to exemplify 
Descartes’s reductive method, since it is part of the conclusion of his only extended description of his own use of his 
method, given in Discourse 8 of the Meteors (see, e.g., Buchwald 2008, Clarke 1982 (173ﬀ.), Garber 2001a, Garber 
2001b, Georgescu and Giurgea 2012).
2 Descartes’s most significant statement of commitment to the unity of sciences is of course the simile of the tree of 
knowledge in the preface to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy (AT ixb: 14–5; CSM i: 186).
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processes’ (12), which I suspect we may take to suggest something strongly systemic.3 As Des 
Chene puts it, for Descartes, ‘the body is to be analysed into systems of mechanisms, and each 
mechanism into simpler mechanisms, until we arrive at mechanisms whose capacities can be 
understood in terms of the modes and derived properties of extended things’ (2001: 154).
I take Des Chene’s identification of systems of mechanisms seriously. However, Des Chene sees 
Descartes as moving away from systems, proceeding through a string of recursive reductions 
until reaching the level of corpuscular mechanics (‘the modes and derived properties of extended 
things’). This is entirely consistent with Descartes’s ontological commitments, but it is not, I 
want to argue, the approach that Descartes takes in accounting for the ‘principal parts’ (Passions 
a. 6) of the body. It is the reduction to the lowest level that I argue against here: instead of 
reduction to corpuscular mechanics, Descartes explains the operation of the body through whole 
systems. And the components of those systems exist at diﬀerent levels. In other words, the 
systems remain systems; they do not get reduced away to corpuscles.
If my reading is correct, then what goes for light does not in fact go for the living body. If the 
explanations of light are taken to be archetypal of Cartesian explanation in natural philosophy, it 
means we have misunderstood at least some of Descartes’s natural philosophy: his explanations 
in physiology (and perhaps elsewhere: see §3.3). Where the explanations do not reduce to 
corpuscular mechanics, this is not a ‘failure’ on Descartes’s part, but a property of the kind of 
explanation in use.
The focus of this paper is not on Descartes’s own claims (in, e.g., the Principles) about what he is 
doing in natural philosophy: my intention is not to recover what Descartes rea!y meant when he 
wrote about explanation. Instead, I am concerned with what Descartes actually does when he 
explains physiology. The ultimate concern of the paper lies with understanding the philosophical 
implications of Descartes’s account of physiology rather than with understanding his intentions. 
Accordingly, I do not attempt to establish whether or not Descartes-the-philosopher would 
agree with my analysis of the work of Descartes-the-physiologist, and I use anachronism where 
3 On interdependence and systematicity, see §3.1.1 below.
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avoiding it would be ineﬃcient.
This is by no means to suggest that the analysis presented here is incompatible with Descartes’s 
philosophy, however. For instance, while Descartes himself does not use the term ‘system’ in the 
sense employed here, a passage in La Forge’s commentary on the 1664 edition of Descartes’s 
Traité de l’homme suggests that something like a systems reading was available in the period: the 
body-machine is ‘composed of many organic parts which, united, work together to produce 
certain movements of which they would not be capable if they were separated’4 (La Forge 1664: 
173). Nor is my aim to describe a method for Descartes’s physiology that is discontinuous with 
his larger project. I take it that aspects of systems explanations turn up throughout Descartes’s 
natural philosophy (§3.3), and that the unity of the sciences is less at risk if we distinguish 
between explanatory and ontic systems, and rule out the latter (at least for now) (§2.2).
In what follows, §2.1 provides a definition of the type of system in question here, in the form of a 
brief outline of its structure; §2.2 makes a distinction between explanatory and ontic systems, 
favouring the former for the purposes of this paper. The type of explanation outlined in §2 is 
then used in §3 to analyse Descartes’s explanations of physiology. §3.1 focuses on his account of 
the heartbeat. First, §3.1.1 shows how the explanation is systemic and compositional. Next, §3.1.2 
demonstrates how Descartes’s explanations are constructed in terms of the eﬀects and 
components set out in §2.1. The analysis of the explanation of the heartbeat concludes by 
showing that the components of the system exist at diﬀerent explanatory levels (§3.1.3). Systems 
explanations are not restricted to the heartbeat and associated systems, which §3.2 demonstrates 
by applying the analysis to explanations of bodily growth and muscular movement, while §3.3 
assesses the extent which systems explanations, or some of their features, may be present outside 
the physiology.
4 ‘. . . composé de plusieurs parties organiques qui estant unies, s’accordent à produire quelques mouvements, dont e!es ne seroient pas 
capable, si e!es etoient separées.’




I make use of systems explanations here as an analytical tool: the application of this analysis in 
the rest of the paper will show how it makes sense of Descartes’s explanations of physiology.
An explanation is systemic insofar as it is given in terms of systems – that is, for the purposes of 
this paper, aggregations of components5, organised in such a way as to determine an eﬀect. I refer 
to the organisation of the components as the system’s ‘composition’, and it is the composition 
that is the ultimate determinant of the system’s eﬀect.6 The components are mostly systems 
themselves. When components are not systemic, they consist of nothing more than the 
behaviour of individual corpuscles (such as the stochastic movement of spirit-corpuscles in 
muscles). Non-systemic components are non-systemic because lower-level organisation plays no 
part in determining their behaviour. All components, both systemic and non-systemic, determine 
their own eﬀects (e.g., a blood-expansion component determines the eﬀect of blood expansion). 
As such, all components are activities rather than static (anatomical) structures: they are things 
that happen and, in doing so, determine other things to happen.
These explanations involve multiple levels when the components of the system exist at diﬀerent 
levels: within the explanation, lower-level components have direct causal and dependency 
relations with higher-level components, and vice versa. The levels distinction relevant here is not 
5 Descartes uses the term ‘part’ (‘partie’ (AT xi: 225–6, 234, 253) or sometimes ‘piece’ (AT xi: 119)). I prefer ‘component’ 
here because of its connection to composition and because of its generality (we tend to think of parts as 
straightforwardly physical, whereas what constitutes a component depends on the system; here, components are 
activities).
6 See Shapiro 2003 (435): ‘[w]hat makes a machine the machine it is . . . is its particular composition’. And Gaukroger 
2002 (393): ‘Descartes wants to subordinate function to structure’. The notion of composition as presented in this 
paper might possibly, then, say something about the problem of function or ‘oﬃce’ (or even teleology) in Descartes’s 
biology. On function in Descartes’s physiology, see the excellent analysis in Brown 2011. On teleology and related 
problems, in addition to Shapiro and Gaukroger, see Des Chene 2001 (§6.1, 117f.) and Simmons 2001.
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between visible and subvisible (as in, e.g., Galison 1984) but between levels of organisation (the 
engine of a car is at a lower level than the car itself, but at a higher level than the pistons). There 
are multiple ways to hierarchise such levels, but doing so with precision is not necessary for the 
argument in this paper, which requires only a distinction between the lowest level and some 
higher level(s): where there are causal or dependency relations between any higher and any lower 
level, the system is multilevel.
2.2 Explanatory versus ontic systems
On the face of it, appeals to whole systems and multiple levels within them ought to be a serious 
problem for Descartes. His metaphysics commits him to an ontology of the natural world that 
cannot involve more than the shape, size and motion of pieces of extended substance. If he is 
invoking system properties and higher levels in preference to the behaviour of corpuscles, he 
appears to be in trouble. One way of dealing with this inconsistency would be to surmise that (A) 
Descartes’s philosophical project is simply not as coherent as he wanted it to be. On reaching the 
outer branches of his tree of knowledge, perhaps he faltered, and perhaps things became 
somewhat messier than they had been within the solid roots of metaphysics. This is possible.7 On 
this reading, if Descartes does include systems of the kind described here in his physiology, they 
are ontic systems: they exist in the real, material world. In that case, he would be (presumably 
inadvertently) giving up on his ontological parsimony and tacitly accepting the existence of 
hearts and lungs as real entities in the world (or, rather, heart-beating and respiration as real 
activities in the world).
We can, however, find such systems in Descartes’s physiology without breaking so radically from 
7 Machamer and McGuire (2009) suggest that inconsistency is the appropriate way to interpret the relation between 
Descartes’s earlier and later work. They do not, however, uphold the kind of incoherence between Descartes’s later 
metaphysics and physiology that (A) entails. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the relevance of 
Machamer and McGuire here.
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his metaphysical commitments if (B) the systems are explanations only.8 On this reading, they are 
not ontic systems. Descartes does have ontic mechanisms, but they can exist only at the lowest 
level (i.e. the corpuscle level). Heart-beating, respiration, and blood-expansion get to be 
components of an explanatory system, but Cartesian ontic mechanisms are composed of 
corpuscle-behaviour alone. This means that, in a Cartesian world, systems with components on 
higher levels can never be isomorphic to ontic mechanisms. In addition, systems explanations 
cannot be direct descriptions of ontic mechanisms9, because systems include components that 
are not available to Cartesian ontic mechanisms. Because systems explanations cannot directly 
describe real-world mechanisms, the explanations may be hypothetical, or heuristic, or they may 
‘overlay’ real-world mechanisms.10 My position is compatible with all three options. In the case of 
overlaying explanations, systems explanations would describe real-world mechanisms, but only 
indirectly, just because the components of the explanatory systems would bottom out at diﬀerent 
levels from the components of the real-world mechanisms.
There is an argument to be made for (A), and the analysis in this paper would be broadly 
compatible with that position. Nevertheless, I have assumed (B) here, partly because it is the less 
revisionist path, and partly because it avoids problems that may be generated by conflating 
explanation with ontology (the paper remains agnostic about whether or not the explanatory 
systems overlay real-world mechanisms).
There might also be a case to be made for (C) an ontic reading of Cartesian systems that 
8 The ‘how-possible’ reading of Descartes’s physiology given by Des Chene (2005) might lie somewhere between the 
incoherence and explanatory-systems readings. In the context of that interpretation, Descartes’s how-possible 
explanations would be systemic rather than strictly reductionist.
9 Recent work on mechanism sees (modern) biological mechanistic explanation precisely as description of real-world 
mechanisms (Machamer et al. 2000: 3). It is a diﬀerence in ontology that allows for the diﬀerence in possibility of 
describing real-world mechanisms.
10 On hypothetical explanation in Descartes’s natural philosophy, see in particular Clarke 1982, ch. 5 (especially 113ﬀ.) 
and Manning 2012.
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maintains the coherence of Descartes’s project. While an ontic reading might seem entirely at 
odds with Descartes’s ontology, perhaps allowing an ontological status to systems is not 
significantly more problematic than allowing it to corpuscles in a world of extended substance.11 
This is potentially interesting, but making the case for it would be an undertaking lengthy 
enough to hijack the thesis of the present paper. Consequently, I leave (C) to be addressed 
elsewhere. If this paper is correct, however, and if (C) does indeed hold, then we will be able to 
say that Descartes’s ontology contains real multilevel systems.
3. Systems in Descartes’s physiology
3.1 The heartbeat
The following section analyses Descartes’s most extensive account of the heartbeat in terms of 
systems. The account comes from Descartes’s Description of the Human Body (hereafter, 
Description), a late manuscript that integrates and expands on his prior work on physiology. The 
analysis shows that the explanation of the heartbeat involves considerably more than corpuscular 
mechanics (as defined in §1), first in terms of its systematicity and composition, then its eﬀects 
and components, and finally its reliance on appeal to multiple explanatory levels.
3.1.1 Systematicity and composition
For the purposes of this paper, a system is an aggregation of components, organised in such a way 
as to determine an eﬀect (§2.1). Consequently, if Descartes’s explanations are given in terms of 
components whose organisation determines a particular eﬀect, we can say that they are systemic.  
The second part of the Description is concerned with explaining the eﬀect of the heartbeat (along 
with the eﬀect of heat generation). While it begins with the movement of the heart itself, the 
complexity of the account escalates rapidly. It soon reaches the point where it is no longer 
limited to the activity of the heart alone. It extends inexorably first to the haematic circulatory 
system, then to the respiratory system, and then (in part three) to nutrition and assimilation (AT 
xi: 231f). The explanation of the heartbeat continues throughout: it is not that Descartes explains 
11 There might be some support for this position to be found in Descartes’s remarks on the real distinction in the 
Principles (1/60). Cf. Sowaal 2004.
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the heartbeat and then moves on to another physiological eﬀect; rather, he explains the 
heartbeat by moving on. The explanation of the heartbeat requires the explanation of circulation, 
respiration, and so on. We see this in a nutshell when the explanation moves from the heart itself 
to circulation:
by these means [the blood in the arteries] swells and rises at the same time as the 
heart; and it is this movement, as much of the heart as of the arteries, that is called the 
pulse
(DHB: 5; AT xi: 232; my emphasis).
Clearly, Descartes does not see the heart and the circulatory system as independent entities. The 
movement of the pulse pertains as much to the heart as to the arteries. This implies that a 
change to the arteries, or to their relations with the heart, would mean a change in the 
movement that constitutes the heartbeat-eﬀect. In other words, organisation (the composition 
of the system) must be playing a part in determining the eﬀect here.
The case for the role of organisation grows stronger as the account continues. Descartes goes on 
to show how, just as the pulse depends on the heartbeat, the heartbeat depends on the pulse, via 
the circulation. This is because the reentry of the blood into the heart is a partial cause of the 
next heartbeat (see §3.1.2). Thus, the heartbeat is dependent on circulation, and circulation is 
dependent on the heartbeat. Following the movement of blood through the circulation, the 
account naturally takes in the pulmonary blood vessels (AT xi: 235f.). And then it turns to the 
lungs, concluding that,
the main use of the lung consists in one thing alone: by means of the respiratory 
air, it thickens and tempers the blood that comes from the right ventricle of the 
heart before it enters the left ventricle; without this it would be too rare and too fine to 
serve to fuel the fire that it encounters there
(DHB: 177; AT xi: 236; my emphasis).
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The Description’s account of the heartbeat does not – and seemingly cannot – keep these bodily 
systems isolated. As soon as the heartbeat is brought up, the circulation of the blood follows 
necessarily. And then respiration follows too. And it does not merely fo!ow, because without the 
thickening of blood during respiration, there would be no heartbeat: respiration is indispensable 
for the process that explains the beating of the heart (and its warmth). It turns out that 
Descartes cannot give an account of the heartbeat without also referring to and relying on 
everything involved in respiration and circulation. Each plays a necessary role in explaining how 
the heartbeat works: in the absence of circulation or respiration, there would be no heartbeat. 
And each plays its role within a specific organisation: if respiration did not precede the entry of 
blood into the left ventricle, the blood would be ‘too rare and too fine’ for the process to 
continue; if circulation did not follow the active phase of the heartbeat, there would be no blood 
to re-enter the heart. Each must occur in a particular order for the heartbeat-eﬀect to be 
produced.
The heartbeat, circulation, and respiration do not constitute, however, the extent of Descartes’s 
explanation. The next section of the Description deals with the nutrition of the body’s organs, 
which is a consequence of the circulation of the blood (AT xi: 245f.). But nutrition results in the 
loss of corpuscles from the blood (AT xi: 246). Thus, the explanation has to include assimilation 
as well. Otherwise, the supply of blood on which the heartbeat, circulation and nutrition depend 
would dry up. At the same time, assimilation depends on both the flow of blood provided by the 
heartbeat and circulation, and on the organ-integrity provided by nutrition. From the heartbeat, 
the circulation of the blood follows. And the nutrition of the organs follows the circulation. And 
assimilation follows nutrition. Simultaneously, each is dependent on the others. What started as 
an account of the heartbeat now encompasses the whole of the body. Each of the major parts of 
the body depends immediately on at least some of the others, which in turn depend on others, 
and on the original part in question. Ultimately, each part ends up depending on the whole 
system. At the same time, the system must depend on its component subsystems:
Please cite version published in The Philosophical Quarterly 65/261 (2015): 669–689.
11
in considering only the exterior of the human body, we never imagined that it had 
enough organs or springs in it to move itself in all the diﬀerent ways in which we 
see it move
(DHB: 170; AT xi: 224).
Descartes’s point is that, although they are not visible, the body does indeed (and must) contain 
all the organs and ‘springs’ it needs to operate. And when ‘one of the principal parts of the body 
decays’ (Passions a. 6; CSM i: 329; AT xi: 330), the whole body dies, and its systems cease to 
function.12 That is, the system of the body as a whole depends on its component subsystems, and 
their organisation, to such an extent that the failure of any one of them results in the failure of 
the whole.
The system of the principal parts of the body is thus not simply a chain of dependencies: it is not 
just the case that the heartbeat must follow respiration; respiration must also follow the 
heartbeat. Without the one, there would not be the other, and, crucially, vice versa. Most of all, it 
is the circularity that makes the dependencies here more than a simple chain. The movement of 
a billiard ball can be dependent on the movement of the ball that struck it, whose movement can 
in turn be dependent on the ball that struck it, and so on: that would constitute a chain. But a 
self-perpetuating system in which each component is simultaneously dependent on each of the 
others and on the system as a whole is a diﬀerent matter. Descartes’s explanation of the 
heartbeat looks like the latter rather than the former. As such, the dependencies are circular, and 
the system is intradependent: its subsystems are reciprocally dependent on each other. A failure 
in any one of them also results in the failure of each of the others (if the respiratory system stops 
working, the heart stops beating, and vice versa). And there is good reason to think that 
Descartes is quite aware of this, given that, after having established the dependencies between 
various functions involved, he describes the circulation and heartbeat as forming a ‘perpetual 
circular motion’ (DHB: 179; AT xi: 239): without the dependencies between functions, there 
12 Descartes does not list what he takes the principal parts to be, but, as the analysis here shows, they must include at 
least the heart and the circulatory, respiratory, and digestive systems – when any of those fails, the others cannot 
continue to work, and the body ceases to operate.
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would be no motion of the blood, and without the circularity of those dependencies, the motion 
would not be circular (blood would end up spraying out somewhere, and the body would die).
Brown (2011) recognises a similar interdependence of subsystems in Descartes’s embryology, in 
which organs develop through accretion of particles deposited by a stream of fluid that flows 
along a circular path, such that ‘the formation of the brain is necessary for the persistence of the 
heart and the formation of the heart a necessary precondition for the formation of the brain’ (12). 
Brown points out that what is special about the interdependence in Descartes’s account of 
embryogenesis is that – unlike the metaphysical dependence of every piece of extended 
substance on every other piece – embryogenesis is not ‘indiﬀerent to the way in which matter is 
arranged’ (13). In other words, the organisation is integral in determining the eﬀect: the 
interdependence of physiological subsystems makes for a strong form of systematicity. What we 
see when we look at the account of the heartbeat is that interdependence goes beyond 
development. For Descartes, the parts of the living body are in a continuous and perpetual state 
of interdependence, and the body itself is therefore strongly systematic for as long as it is alive.
The interdependence here is a strong case; it is not the sole determiner of systematicity. For 
some of the body’s subsystems, the dependency is clearly one-way: muscular movement or 
hearing both depend on the whole body, but not vice versa. Aside from the possibility of internal 
interdependence in muscular movement and hearing systems, these cases still fulfil the minimum 
condition for systematicity given in §2.1 (a particular organisation of components (of some kind) 
that determines a particular eﬀect).
So far, everything in the explanation has taken place at a high level (heartbeat, circulation, 
respiration, etc.); the following section moves the analysis to a lower level of organisation: what, 
on Descartes’s account, happens inside the heart. It finds the components involved in the 
explanation, and shows how, through their organisation, they determine the eﬀects of the 
system.
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3.1.2 Effects, components and activities
Systems, like bodies, are made up of parts, which I refer to here as ‘components’. The obvious 
place to look for the components of Descartes’s physiological systems is in the anatomical 
structures of the body: hearts and lungs and so on. However, in what follows, I argue that we can 
make better sense of Descartes’s systemic explanations if we do not take the components to be 
anatomical. On the reading presented here, the components are activities instead: heart-beating 
and respiration, rather than hearts and lungs. We saw an instance of this in the last section, in 
Descartes’s recognition that the pulse is a movement continuous throughout various anatomical 
structures, and not localisable to any particular one. The activities that Descartes invokes are 
often motions (colliding, falling, etc.), but they need not be: they could also be, e.g., resistance, or 
tendency to motion.
The main section of the Description, titled ‘on the motion of the heart and blood’, does begin 
with anatomy. Here, though, anatomy is only background knowledge for the explanation of the 
heartbeat and circulation. As such, it is necessary both for constructing and for understanding 
the explanation, but it is not part of the explanation itself. The introduction to the Description 
claims that the text requires only minimal knowledge of anatomy, and that anything beyond the 
very basics will be introduced when necessary (AT xi: 226). Echoing the earlier Discourse (AT vi: 
47), Descartes asks the reader to obtain and dissect ‘the heart of some land animal, something 
reasonably large (for they are more or less similar to those of men)’. We are then expected to 
follow along with the dissection while he briefly describes the heart’s gross anatomy (DHB: 172–
4; AT xi: 228–31). That this is background knowledge is made explicit when Descartes segues into 
the explanation proper:
When the anatomy of the heart is seen in this way, if one considers that it always 
has more heat in it when the animal is alive than any other part of the body, and 
that the blood is of such a nature that when it is a little hotter than usual it 
expands very quickly, one cannot doubt that the movement of the heart, and fo!owing it 
the pulse, or the beating of the arteries, occurs in the way that I sha! describe
(DHB: 174; AT xi: 231; my emphasis).
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Descartes lists three items of knowledge necessary for his explanation but not part of it: cardiac 
anatomy, the heart’s greater warmth relative to the rest of the body, and the propensity of blood 
to expand at low temperatures. (We should presumably add the principles of his physics as a tacit 
fourth.) His point here is that, in light of these three items, the heartbeat and circulation must 
work in just the way he is about to describe. This implies two things: that the explanation is yet 
to begin, and that anatomy is not a component of the explanation – i.e. that it is background 
knowledge.
At first sight, it seems surprising that the anatomy of the heart should not play a role in an 
explanation of the heartbeat. But (per §2.1), components are activities. And seeing components 
as activities makes sense of Descartes’s treatment of anatomy: a dissected heart is inactive – or 
‘deflated (as it always is when animals are dead)’ (DHB: 173; AT xi: 229) – and the features of an 
inactive heart do not themselves explain the active beating of the heart.13 Consequently, the 
anatomical features of the heart are not components in Descartes’s explanatory system. It is only 
when Descartes begins to describe a system of active components (making use of the background 
knowledge of anatomy) that he begins to explain the heartbeat (and the circulation). This much 
is consistent with his explanations of physical phenomena outside of physiology: it is the 
tendency to motion of particles that carries the weight in explaining light propagation, for 
instance, rather than the particles themselves. In the terms of this paper, tendency to motion 
would constitute an activity.
The explanation proceeds as follows:
[w]hen the heart is elongated and deflated, there is no blood in its ventricles, except 
for a small amount which remains from that which has previously been rarefied. 
This is why two large drops enter them there, one fa!ing from the vena cava into 
its right ventricle, and the other fa!ing from the pulmonary vein into the left one, 
13 A dissected heart is not necessarily inactive for Descartes. In his correspondence with Plempius, he cites two 
experiments on fish hearts ‘which, after they have been cut out, go on beating . . .’ (CSMK: 80; AT i: 523). In this case, 
although dissected, they are still active hearts. It is still the activity that is relevant. See to Plempius, 15 February 1638 
(AT i: 523) and 23 March 1638 (AT ii: 66f.).
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and the small amount of rarefied blood that remains in these ventricles, mixing 
straightaway with the fresh blood coming in, is like a kind of yeast, which causes it 
to heat and expand immediately, and by these means the heart swe!s, hardens, and 
becomes a little squatter in shape . . .
(DHB: 174; AT xi: 231; my emphases).
This short passage alone makes use of activities of elongation, deflation, remaining, rarefaction, 
entering, falling, mixing, causing, heating, expanding, swelling, hardening and becoming ‘a little 
squatter in shape’. These are the components in the account. They are what Descartes uses to 
construct the explanation. Drops of blood enter and fall into the ventricles. There, they mix with 
previously rarefied blood, which acts ‘like a kind of yeast [levain]’. This causes the new blood to 
heat up and expand. As a result, the heart ‘swells, hardens, and becomes a little squatter in shape’. 
At the same time, the membranes between the vena cava and the right ventricle, and between 
the pulmonary vein and the left ventricle are forced closed (like valves). This prevents the blood 
from exiting the ventricle the way it entered. Instead, it escapes through the pulmonary artery 
and the aorta, from the right and left ventricles respectively (AT xi: 232).
Anatomy in itself is not directly explanatory within the account, but it is not entirely absent 
either. Where it is invoked, it is subordinated to the activity. The vena cava comes into the 
explanation only as the place from which blood enters. Similarly, the ventricles are the place 
where new blood falls and mixes with the rarefied blood, and where that rarefied blood has 
remained after the active phase of the heartbeat. The ventricles are also present in the account 
via the constraining activity that conspires with the rarefaction of the blood to determine its exit 
through the arteries (AT xi: 232). In the same way, the blood is not portrayed here as simply a 
fluid being pumped through the heart. It is active throughout the account. The falling of fresh 
blood into the heart and its mixing with the remaining rarefied blood (partly) determines its 
expansion. And the expansion itself is, for Descartes, the activity that inflates the heart. Even the 
rarefied blood that remains in the ventricles does not sit there passively: Descartes explicitly 
describes it in active terms: as causing the fresh blood to expand when they mix.
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So, the components in the explanation are activities. And it is their activity that gives them their 
explanatory power: the heart’s deflating does something, and what it does contributes to what the 
whole system does. But, that is not to say that the activity of the system reduces down to what 
its components do. Any component isolated from the system’s composition would contribute 
nothing to the activity of the system. It is the composition, and not the constituent components, 
that determines the system’s eﬀect. Thus, rarefying blood would simply expand uselessly if it 
were not within a ventricle too small to keep it contained, with valves that open to let it flow out, 
etc. But, when rarefying blood is taken along with heart deflation and the other components of 
the system, in the right composition, we get the heartbeat.
So far, the components involved in the explanation have all been at a fairly high level. Even an 
activity as simple as the falling of blood is at a clearly higher level than corpuscles (since talk 
about blood behaviour is not talk about corpuscle behaviour). As it stands, the explanation is 
clearly not a reduction all the way down to corpuscular mechanics: corpuscles have not even 
entered into it at this point. We still need to establish whether the explanation ever reaches 
down to corpuscles. The next section looks at a corpuscle-level account of blood expansion in 
the heart, and then shows how Descartes has to integrate it with plainly higher-level components 
in order to construct an explanation of the heartbeat.
3.1.3 Multilevel explanation
The section of the Description that deals with the motion of the heart and blood provides no 
explanation of the initial cause of the blood’s expansion. What it does oﬀer is an analogy in 
which the blood acts like yeast (AT xi: 231). But it does not explain the mechanism that causes 
the yeast-like activity. For that explanation, we need to look at an account later in the Description, 
in the section on embryogenesis:
when most of the blood leaves the heart at the time of diastole, those of its 
particles which remain there enter into the flesh, where they find pores disposed 
in such a way, and fibres agitated in such a way, that there is only matter of the 
first element surrounding them; and at systole these pores change shape because 
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the heart lengthens, which makes the particles of blood, which remained there as 
if they were to serve as yeast, leave there with a great speed, and in this way 
entering easily into the new blood coming into the heart, they make its particles 
separate from one another, and in separating thus they acquire the form of fire
(DHB: 203; AT xi: 281f.; translation adjusted).
The yeast allusion reappears in this passage, but this time gets accounted for down to the 
corpuscle (particle) level. In this case, the ‘yeast’ activity is explained by the ejection of 
corpuscles of blood from pores in the heart wall. These corpuscles hit the new blood 
concurrently entering the heart. The yeast-acting blood corpuscles move at such speed that 
collision with the corpuscles of the new blood makes the latter move significantly further and 
faster. The result of this is that the blood both heats up and expands. As in the account covered 
in §3.1.2, once the blood has expanded and most of it has forced its way into the arteries under 
its own pressure, a small amount remains in the ventricles. Descartes now specifies that what 
remains sinks into pores in the heart wall. The rarefied blood stays there until the heart enters 
systole (its passive phase for Descartes) and relaxes. In relaxing, the heart lengthens, compressing 
its walls relative to their state when the heart was ‘a little squatter’ during diastole. This 
compression of the walls is also a compression of the pores within them. The result of this is to 
force the yeast-acting blood out into the new blood that is in the process of entering. At this 
point, the active phase begins again, and the whole process of the heartbeat repeats.
A fairly obvious objection arises at this point. Since the passage above shows that Descartes has 
an explanation of blood expansion in terms of corpuscles, perhaps the account of the heartbeat 
might simply be straightforward Cartesian reduction to corpuscular mechanics, and not a 
multilevel system after all. However, this relies on mistaking a (partial) appeal to the behaviour of 
corpuscles for a full reduction of the phenomenon to the corpuscular level. In the account above, 
corpuscles are invoked for only part of the explanation. There are three components at the 
corpuscular level: (1) blood corpuscles moving at high speed, (2) blood corpuscle collisions and (3) 
increased mean blood corpuscle movement as a result of (2). (There are also the corpuscles of the 
first element (the smallest of Descartes’s three elements), although their role is fairly obscure in 
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this particular account.14) At most, this can count as a reduction of blood heating (and, indirectly, 
blood expansion, because increased mean blood corpuscle movement leads to expansion as well 
as heat) to the corpuscular level. But the eﬀect in question is the heartbeat, and the corpuscle 
level here certainly does not provide enough to explain how the heart beats.15
Given that the blood-corpuscle behaviour alone is not enough to explain the heartbeat-eﬀect, we 
need to consider the other components Descartes invokes in the account above. If we look at 
what he actually appeals to, rather than concentrating on the corpuscles, we see a rather diﬀerent 
picture of explanation from the corpuscular-mechanics approach. The corpuscle-talk is 
integrated with appeals to higher levels throughout. The remaining blood corpuscles enter into 
the ‘flesh’ of the heart, which is (at least partially) described in terms of pores and fibres. Pores 
and fibres are not corpuscle-level descriptions. They presumably could be reduced to corpuscles, 
in principle. But that is not the level to which Descartes appeals here: the interaction of blood 
corpuscles with the heart wall is not explained in terms of corpuscular mechanics. Most notably, 
the movement of the yeast-acting blood corpuscles in the account is caused by the relaxation/
lengthening of the heart (via the resultant contraction of the pores). If the heartbeat-eﬀect is the 
highest level in this explanation, and the blood corpuscles the lowest, then heart-lengthening is 
surely somewhere in between (and presumably closer to the top). So, it is the speed of the 
movement of the yeast-acting blood corpuscles that allows them to impart movement to the 
corpuscles of new blood and thus cause heating and expansion. But, it is the higher-level 
lengthening of the heart that causes the movement of the yeast-acting corpuscles. As such, the 
explanation is incomplete if it is left at the corpuscle level: the corpuscle-level activity is 
explained by means of a higher-level activity.
14 There are strong parallels between this account and the explanation of fermentation in damp hay in Principles 4:92. 
There, corpuscles of the first element accelerate corpuscles of grass sap, ultimately causing heat, under certain 
conditions. Similarly, a little earlier in the Description, Descartes discusses the origin of heat in the developing foetus in 
terms of matter of the second element agitated by matter of the first (AT xi: 281).
15 In the Rules, Descartes characterises reduction as comprising both an analytic and a synthetic step (AT x: 379–87). 
What can be synthesised from the terms in use here (the corpuscle behaviour) is blood heating/expansion rather than 
the heartbeat.
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In fact, the explanation is still not complete even with the integration of blood corpuscle 
behaviour and heart-lengthening. It is incomplete because it does not yet explain the heartbeat 
eﬀect. An explanation of the heartbeat that goes down to the corpuscle level will need to 
integrate (1) the account discussed in this section of this paper with (2) the higher-level 
explanation discussed in the previous two sections. (1) explicitly explains only the production of 
heat in the heart. Implicitly, it also explains blood expansion. But it does not explain the 
heartbeat. Explaining the eﬀect requires appealing to (at least) the following features of (2): the 
swelling of the heart, the restriction of space for the expanding blood in the ventricles, the valve 
operation at the entrance and exit blood vessels, circulation and respiration (and probably also 
nutrition and assimilation). Thus, the account does not explain the heartbeat without appealing 
to multiple levels. The corpuscle level is required to explain the expansion of the blood – but the 
explanation requires appealing to the higher-level interactions with the pores and fibres of the 
heart wall and (especially) to the higher-level lengthening of the heart. At the same time, higher 
levels explain the swelling of the heart, and the restriction that causes it and forces the blood 
out. But they do so only alongside the explanation of blood expansion. All these levels are 
necessary for the account to explain the heartbeat.
The natural objection now is to point out that, in principle, the whole account could be 
translated into the corpuscular level, even if Descartes chose not to. The problem with this is 
that it conflates explanatory reduction with ontological reduction. In principle, Descartes ought 
to be able to reduce the relaxation and lengthening of the heart to corpuscular mechanics, given 
his metaphysics (i.e. the physical world is nothing but extended substance diﬀerentiated by 
movement). That is, ontological reduction should always be a possibility in the Cartesian world. 
But, when the goal is an explanation of the heartbeat, a description of heart-lengthening in terms 
of corpuscles would just miss the point. The question here is one of relevance to the explanation. 
In other words, it is a question of what plays an explanatory role. Heart-lengthening is necessary 
for explaining the movement of the yeast-acting blood corpuscles. As such, it plays an 
explanatory role. Now, heart-lengthening could indeed be reduced to the corpuscle level. Doing 
so would require an account of the structure, behaviour and interactions of the corpuscles that 
make up the heart wall. It would also require a similar account of the corpuscles that make up 
any other parts of the heart’s anatomy that move when the heart lengthens, since they would all 
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be involved in corpuscle-to-corpuscle interactions in the process of heart-lengthening. Because 
this would be a corpuscle-level explanation (and thus non-systemic), we would not need to 
account for every single corpuscle. But we would need to account for every corpuscle behaviour 
that, in aggregate, composes heart-lengthening.
If Descartes’s aim were to explain heart-lengthening itself, or some other higher-level elastic 
eﬀect, the corpuscle-talk might fulfil an explanatory role. But given that the aim is to explain the 
heartbeat, it is not at all clear that anything would be gained by invoking low-level corpuscle 
behaviour in preference to high-level heart-lengthening. Worse, doing so risks obscuring the 
relevant component of the explanatory system (heart-lengthening) beneath the profusion of 
corpuscle talk. The situation is analogous to attempting to explain the operation of a mechanical 
clock by appealing to the interactions of the molecules, atoms, or subatomic particles (or, for 
that matter, corpuscles) that make up the material of the cogs: if you were to ask me how a clock 
works, and I were to respond by talking about quantum probability clouds, you would rightly 
accuse me of answering a diﬀerent question. My response would have been, intuitively, below a 
relevance threshold for an explanation of the operation of a clock. In the same way, for Descartes 
to reduce heart-lengthening to the corpuscle level would be to answer a diﬀerent question from 
that of how the heartbeat works. It is in this sense that higher-level heart-lengthening is relevant 
to the explanation while the corpuscle behaviour is not.16 Even if Descartes may claim elsewhere 
that explanation should be in terms of corpuscular mechanics, when he explains the heartbeat, 
he pays attention to a relevance threshold. As such, he selects components from diﬀerent levels, 
on the basis of their relevance to the explanation.
Another version of this objection might be to point out that the heart (along with everything 
else in the material world for Descartes) originally developed from nothing more than the 
activity of individual corpuscles. That is, that whatever complex systems might exist in living 
bodies were ultimately formed by corpuscles knocking into each other. But, similarly, an account 
of the development of the heart would be an answer to a diﬀerent question: ‘where did the heart 
16 My point here is similar to the discussion of bottoming-out in §5.1 of Machamer et al. 2000: ‘[b]ottoming out is 
relative . . . The explanation comes to an end, and description of lower-level mechanisms would be irrelevant’ (13).
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come from?’, rather than ‘how does the heart work?’. If Descartes started to explain how the 
heart works by appealing to corpuscle collisions in his cosmological vortices, we would justifiably 
accuse him of missing the point of the question.
There is good evidence, then, for concluding that Descartes does appeal to multiple levels in his 
explanation of the heartbeat. He appeals to the higher-level activity of heart-lengthening, for 
example, when he discusses the production of heat and the expansion of blood in terms of (low-
level) corpuscular mechanics. But there are also good reasons to go further and claim that 
multilevelness in systems provides Descartes with better explanations (in at least some 
circumstances in physiology) than the strict reduction he is supposed to employ. That is, strict 
adherence to single-level reduction would obscure the higher-level components that play central 
roles in the explanation. Thus, Descartes’s strategy is not to pursue reduction down to lowest-
level explanation. Instead, he picks and chooses the more relevant components for his 
explanatory system from amongst multiple explanatory levels.
3.2 More systems: muscular movement and nutrition
The Description’s explanation of the heartbeat and circulation is not the only system in 
Descartes’s physiology. We can see the same structure of explanation in the account of muscular 
movement in The Passions. The account appeals to the corpuscles that make up the animal spirits. 
But the spirit corpuscles are only components in a larger explanatory system. On this account, a 
muscle contracts and lengthens because it contains a large quantity of very small corpuscles 
which move ‘very quickly, sometimes merely eddying in the place where they are located . . . , and 
sometimes flowing into the opposed muscle’ (a. 11; CSM i: 332; AT xi: 366). The spirit corpuscles 
move in much the same way as the corpuscles of rarefied blood in the account of the heartbeat. 
Through this movement, the muscle containing the spirit corpuscles becomes swollen. As a 
result of the swelling, it contracts, and thus pulls, giving us muscular movement. But the 
behaviour of individual particles alone does not determine the movement of the muscle. In 
addition, the explanation of muscular movement requires appeal to the following higher-level 
components: the space restriction of the muscle itself (in the same way as the heartbeat requires 
the space restriction of the ventricles), the opposition of a pair of muscles, and some means to 
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control which muscle contains the majority of the spirits (Passions a. 11). It is this entire system, 
with its particular composition, that forms the explanation of muscular movement.
We can find similar use of systems explanation in the much earlier Treatise on Man (written 1632–
3). Its explanation of nutrition is one such case. It appeals to the collision of blood corpuscles 
with the ‘roots’ of organs, which originate from ‘the extremities of the little branches’ of the 
arteries. As the blood flows through the arteries, the pressure of the pulse following the active 
phase of the heartbeat forces some blood corpuscles into contact with the organ roots. The 
blood corpuscles push the organ root corpuscles ‘in front of them a little, and in this way 
gradually replace them’. But this alone is not what causes nutrition for Descartes. You get 
nutrition when new blood corpuscles are left attached to organ roots. And this is explained by 
appeal to a higher-level component: ‘at the moment when the arteries deflate, each of these parts 
is stopped in its place, and this alone means it is joined to those it touches’ (TM: 103; AT xi: 126). 
Higher-level artery deflation is what causes blood corpuscles to remain attached to the organ 
roots with which they had collided, and thus to provide them with nutrition. In this case, the 
activity of the corpuscles is necessary to explain nutrition. But it is not suﬃcient for the 
explanation, because the system also requires appeal to artery deflation, on a higher explanatory 
level, within the context of a composition that determines the eﬀect of nutrition. As such, this 
explanation too consists not of corpuscle behaviour alone but of a composed system comprising 
components on separate levels, with explanatory appeals made between levels.
Of course, Descartes also gives some accounts that straightforwardly seem to keep to a single 
explanatory level – Man’s treatment of digestion, for instance (AT xi: 121). This is to be expected: 
sometimes the relevancy criterion bottoms and tops out at the corpuscle level, and some eﬀects 
may be explicable in terms of corpuscle behaviour alone, without the latter’s being placed within 
the context of a system. However, as the previous sections have shown, corpuscular mechanics is 
far from being the only means of explanation in Descartes’s physiology: it is in terms of systems 
that Descartes explains (amongst other things) what he takes to be the most central function of 
the body – the heartbeat – where most is at stake (AT xi: 245).
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3.3 Systems beyond physiology17
So far, this paper has maintained a simplified distinction between Descartes’s explanations in 
physiology and his explanations elsewhere: physiology involves systems, while corpuscular 
mechanics suﬃces for physics. In truth, that distinction is not quite so straightforward. 
Descartes’s cosmological vortices certainly look like complex systems. In his optics, he appeals to 
higher levels alongside corpuscles: reflection and refraction are explained through the motion of 
balls (analogous to corpuscles, i.e. low-level) thrown, respectively, against the ground and into 
water (both higher-level) (AT vi: 93–101). I have focused on physiology here because physiology 
seems to be where the disparity between corpuscular mechanics and the explanations Descartes 
actually uses is the most noticeable.
But that is not to say that systems explanations, or some features of systems explanation, are not 
present elsewhere in Descartes’s natural philosophy. At the very least, I suspect Descartes 
frequently finds that appealing to higher levels produces better (i.e. more explanatorily relevant) 
explanations throughout natural philosophy than could be provided by pure corpuscular 
mechanics. He may well find the same for systematicity in some cases, although perhaps to a 
more limited degree than in physiology. The account of vortices, for example, would probably be 
closer to what Haugeland (1978: 216) calls a ‘morphological explanation’, in which the eﬀect is the 
product of the aggregate activity of many parts but is indiﬀerent to their organisation: if you 
completely rearrange the parts of a vortex, you still have a functioning vortex; the same cannot 
be said of a living body. Regardless, to whatever extent Descartes’s explanations elsewhere look 
like the systems discussed here, the conclusions of this paper will be (partially) applicable 
throughout his natural philosophy.
4. Conclusion
Descartes is generally taken to be a strict explanatory reductionist about the natural world. His 
metaphysical commitments seem to tie him to explanation in terms of corpuscular mechanics: 
17 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer both for raising the concerns addressed in the following section and for 
suggesting relevant examples.
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his aim appears to be the reduction of complex observable phenomena to nothing more than the 
particular behaviour of individual subvisible corpuscles taken in isolation. However, at least some 
of Descartes’s explanations in physiology (and perhaps elsewhere) look nothing like explanations 
in terms of corpuscular mechanics. Instead, they are systemic, and they appeal to multiple 
explanatory levels. In these systems, the eﬀects are not determined by the behaviour of 
individual corpuscles. They are determined by the composition of the whole system. And the 
components of that system are drawn from diﬀerent levels, with interlevel causation and 
dependency relations.
The analysis oﬀered here shows that we misunderstand Descartes’s natural philosophy if, as the 
standard view has it, we take him to pursue reduction to the lowest level in order to provide 
explanations. It is not only that he does not in fact reduce what he takes to be the principal 
physiological systems to corpuscular mechanics. Systems explanations are better explanations in 
some cases, where it is the entire composition that explains the eﬀect (rather than the behaviour 
of individual corpuscles), and where each component is taken from the level that is explanatorily 
relevant for that component. Thus, the explanatory power of Descartes’s physiology comes not 
from its reductionism as such, but from its willingness to stop the reduction where appropriate.18
18 Thanks to my colleagues at Ghent, and in particular to Eric Schliesser, Laura Georgescu and two excellent 
anonymous referees for extremely helpful comments.
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